The technology is moving faster than the frameworks. That is not a crisis. But it needs to become a priority.
There are conferences that discuss the future, and there are conferences that begin to build it. The third International Conference on Nuclear Propulsion for Shipping, hosted by NTNU Ã…lesund and co-organized by DNV on June 9, was firmly in the second category.
Professor Jan EmblemsvÃ¥g and his team at NTNU have built something genuinely valuable over three editions, with strong institutional backing from Professor Hans Petter Hildre, Director of the Department of Ocean Operations and Civil Engineering at NTNU Ã…lesund, who opened the conference with a sobering energy calculation: the renewable capacity of all of Europe combined would not be sufficient to power Norway’s offshore fleet on hydrogen or ammonia alone. The implicit conclusion was clear before the first reactor developer took the stage.
DNV’s role as co-organizer adds institutional weight that matters in a field where credibility is everything. The content was excellent. The hosting was first class. And the trajectory of the event itself tells a story: this conversation is accelerating.
Which makes it all the more important to name, clearly and constructively, where the gaps are.
When DNV’s Vice President for Business Development was asked directly where the IMO Nuclear Code stands today, he paused and said: “To be honest, I don’t know.”
That moment was not a failure. It was an honest signal about where this industry actually is. We are early. The questions outnumber the answers. And for a conference with around 200 participants from reactor developers, shipyards, classification societies, financiers, and naval operators, that is both understandable and worth examining carefully.
The engineering presentations were impressive. The ambition was real. But as the day progressed, a pattern emerged: the technical side of nuclear propulsion for commercial shipping is advancing rapidly, while the regulatory, legal, and insurance architecture that any commercial deployment will require is still largely unbuilt. And the gap between the two is not being discussed with the same urgency.
The IMO question
The existing IMO Code of Safety for Nuclear Merchant Ships dates from 1981. It was written for a world that never materialized. No update has been adopted. Several speakers acknowledged this, and the consensus was that an update is necessary before any commercial international operation becomes possible. But no one in the room could say with confidence where that process currently stands, what the realistic timeline is, or which flag states are actively pushing it forward.
The Norwegian flag was mentioned as proactive. The US and UK flags were referenced as likely participants given their nuclear naval programs. Beyond that, the picture was thin.
This is not a criticism of the conference organizers. It reflects the actual state of the field. But it points to a structural gap: the technical community is moving, the regulatory community is not yet in the same room with the same urgency.
“To be honest, I don’t know.” DNV’s Vice President for Business Development, when asked where the IMO Nuclear Code stands today. Honest. And telling.
Liability: the question that was sidestepped
Port access and liability in foreign jurisdictions were raised directly during the Q&A. The honest answer from the panel was that this is currently handled case by case, and that bilateral agreements between flag states and port states are the most realistic interim mechanism before any international treaty framework exists.
The Paris Convention on Nuclear Liability took 22 years to negotiate. That reference was made in passing, almost as dark humor. Nobody followed up on what the practical interim path looks like for a ship that wants to call at Singapore, Rotterdam, or Shanghai.
Several representatives from P&I clubs were present in the audience. My impression was that they had hoped for more dedicated time on the legal and insurance dimension, and that this topic has clear potential to become a central track at future editions. Given the speed at which this field is developing, it is an open question whether the annual cadence of this conference will be sufficient. The subject may not wait a full year.
The conference is structured around the engineering challenge, which is appropriate given its NTNU roots. But the field has matured to a point where a future edition needs to explicitly expand to a two-day format, with a dedicated track for legal, liability, and insurance questions. The technical and the contractual need to develop in parallel, not sequentially.
Cybersecurity: the absent conversation
There is one topic that was almost entirely absent from the agenda, and it is one that will not stay absent for long.
The introduction of IACS Unified Requirements E26 and E27 was a genuine step forward for maritime cybersecurity. It moved the discipline from an end-of-project checklist to an early design requirement, embedded in the shipbuilding process from the start. That shift took years to achieve and represents real progress.
But for nuclear-powered vessels, it will not be sufficient to simply apply these generic rules. A nuclear propulsion system requires a nuclear-specific cyber safety case, one that is linked to the reactor design from the very beginning, not adapted from a framework built for conventional ships.
The attack surface is different. The consequences of a successful intrusion are different. And the integration between digital reactor control systems, power management, and ship automation creates interdependencies that generic maritime cybersecurity requirements were not written to address.
Nuclear propulsion needs its own cyber safety framework, developed in parallel with the reactor design work, not after the first vessel is in the water.
With a background in Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit, I have watched industries repeatedly discover their cybersecurity requirements after the architecture is already built. That is always more expensive and more dangerous than designing security in from the start. Nuclear propulsion needs its own cyber safety framework, developed in parallel with the reactor design work, not after the first vessel is in the water.
Finance: the one voice that asked the structural questions
Alfred Butrous, Director of Global Shipping, Logistics and Offshore at Citigroup, was the most structurally useful presenter of the day, not because his content was the most dramatic, but because he asked the questions the industry needs to answer before any of the engineering ambitions become bankable reality.
His central point: financing is not a downstream problem. If it is not considered early in the contract and regulatory structure, it becomes a gating item. The industry has seen this before with floating production units, which have similarly complex contract features and long lead times. The lesson is that financing structures need to be designed alongside the asset, not after it.
His presence also signals something broader. Citigroup is not attending conferences like this to be polite. They are positioning early in a market that does not yet exist but that they expect to be significant. For the industry, having a bank of that caliber asking hard questions about residual value, security structures, and government support requirements is genuinely useful. It forces precision.
The honest answer on government support is that the first units will require it. No commercial lender wants to be first on a technology with no comparable precedent and no established residual value framework. Export credit agencies and development finance institutions will need to play a bridging role. Whether European government institutions are actually preparing instruments for this is a question that deserves a direct answer, and one I am pursuing.
The pressure that changes everything
There is one factor that was referenced repeatedly throughout the day but never fully analyzed: China.
China was cited as the industrialization benchmark, the country that took solar from American invention to global mass production, that has opened 30 nuclear power plants since 2013 while the US opened two, and that has stated carbon neutrality by 2060 as a national goal with the industrial policy to back it.
What was not discussed is China’s specific maritime nuclear ambitions, which shipyards and reactor developers are active in that space, and what it means for the Norway-US collaboration if China deploys nuclear-powered commercial vessels first and sets the cost benchmark.
Naming China as a competitive threat in the maritime nuclear space, rather than just an industrialization reference, is a conversation this community needs to have openly.
My reading of the room is that the people present understand this pressure. The sense of urgency is real. But naming China as a competitive threat in the maritime nuclear space, rather than just an industrialization reference, is a conversation this community needs to have openly.
The regulatory gap will not close by itself. The liability framework will not write itself. The cybersecurity requirements will not emerge from a vacuum. And the financing structures will not be invented at the last moment.
What was demonstrated in Ã…lesund is that the technical foundation is being built seriously and with real momentum. The next phase requires the same seriousness about everything that sits around the reactor.
Read also:
Nuclear Propulsion for Shipping: What to Expect from Ã…lesund
China’s Nuclear Leap: Thorium Reactors and the New Maritime Race
From Sunnmøre to the Future Fleet: What Nuclear Propulsion Could Mean for Zero-Carbon Shipping

